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Introduction 
When we hear the name Tony Blair, what is the first thing we think 
about? For most of us it is Iraq. It would be a huge simplification to narrow 
down the ten years he served as the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom (UK) to this one word. Over the ten years Tony Blair was in 
office, the system of international relations as we knew it had changed 
completely.  
The first decade after the end of the Cold War was full of high 
expectations, hopes for changes and great challenges for the newly 
established world order. From the very beginning of the new era, the 
international community had to face tasks and questions that had not 
come up in the previous years. Therefore, there was not a verified pattern 
how to handle these situations and new solutions needed to be carried 
out. We should remember the new ethnic conflicts that emerged in Africa, 
the Caucasus and the Balkans. Such as the Rwandan Genocide, which 
the United Nations (UN) failed to stop, the Yugoslav Wars known for war 
crimes and human rights violations or the Somali Civil War, which is going 
on for two decades. The 1990s were also characteristic of the rising 
number of terrorist incidents that led to the climax in a form of 9/11 
attacks. Another milestone was set during the 1990 – it is said to be the 
beginning of the real Information Age. With the digitalisation of society 
comes also the dark side. This dark side has become to be known as 
cyber crime – another new phenomenon that the international community 
had to learn how to cope with.  
This thesis will focus on the foreign policy conducted during the ten 
years Tony Blair served as the Prime Minister of the UK. The aim is to 
analyse whether the proclamations from the manifestos, mission 
statements and major speeches were corresponding with the real actions 
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executed by the Labour government between years 1997-2007. The 
analysis also focuses on whether the set goals of those actions 
conducted were actually fulfilled. To maintain better understating of the 
thesis, the manifestos, mission statements and major speeches are put in 
the context with other events; they are not all mentioned in the first 
chapter. 
The first chapter starts with a brief description of how Tony Blair 
became the leader of the Labour Party and how his desire to change 
created the New Labour. It also covers briefly the General Election in 
1997 – the first election after eighteen years that the Labour Party has 
won. The thesis sums up the basics of Blair’s style as the Prime Minister. 
The main focus of this chapter lays on what helped to form the framework 
for British foreign policy. It stresses out the importance of advisers and 
co-workers to Tony Blair, as he had no previous experience of either 
minister job, or foreign affairs. It covers the discomfiture in the first 
months of Labour government concerning foreign policy, precisely the 
disputes over statements of Tony Blair and his Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook. It looks into two major speeches – Cook’s mission statement 
presented in May 1997 and Blair’s speech at the Mansion House in 
November later that year. The first chapter shows the situation as it was 
before the proclaimed theory was questioned by any real action. 
 The second part of the thesis analyses practical examples of 
consequences of foreign policy that was carried out by the Labour 
government. It also describes how Blair’s view on foreign policy changed 
in the light of executed measures. This is reflected in the speeches and 
statements given by Tony Blair or his authorised colleagues. The thesis 
describes five military conflicts that the UK was dragged into during Blair’s 
premiership. It follows the chronological order of the conflicts. All five 
chapters of this part contain the background of respective conflict, the 
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involvement of the UK in the conflict, the attitude of the international 
community towards respective conflict, whether the goals of those 
interventions were fulfilled and a reflection on what the motives of Tony 
Blair were and whether those motives were corresponding with his 
statements. 
The first conflict to be addressed is the ongoing dispute in Iraq 
culminating with the operation Desert Fox in December 1998. It was the 
first encounter with international scene for Tony Blair and also his first 
encounter with Saddam Hussein. 
The second conflict Britain was involved in during Blair’s 
premiership was the dispute over Kosovo. The conflict was crucial for 
shaping Blair’s view of foreign affairs and Britain’s involvement in them. 
During the escalation of the conflict Blair gave one of the defining 
speeches. It was the doctrine of international community he formulated in 
Chicago in 1999. 
The case of Sierra Leone was the most successful case of 
humanitarian interventions for Blair. British troops were originally only a 
back up force for the UN contingent. As the conflict was escalating, UK 
soldiers were in the lead of the actions. The international community 
favoured the process and even the result of the mission. 
The events of September 11th 2001 and the following military action 
towards Afghanistan meant a turning point in Blair’s vision of the 
international community. The whole concept of western countries as 
harbours of democracy was shaken by the attacks. And Tony Blair had to 
become stricter with his demands on the international stage. 
The last conflict addressed in the thesis is the second conflict with 
Iraq that Tony Blair encountered. Alongside the US Britain entered the 
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war in Iraq on March 20th 2003. Prior and following this day was marked 
with a lot of controversies. Result of those controversies was the inquiry 
in 2009. 
The thesis is based on both printed sources and internet sources. 
The most references are directed to the publication from John Kampfner, 
Blair’s Wars. This publication is probably the most complex work 
concerning the issue of foreign policy of Tony Blair. Official documents 
issued for example by the UN are used as further sources. Frequently, 
research papers conducted for needs of respective organisations are 
used, such as the House of Commons. A valid part of the information was 
also obtained from Tony Blair’s memoirs. Last but not least, there are 
references made to variety of respected media corporations, such as the 
BBC. Due to the relative newness of the subject, the opinions on 
presented topics may differ from author to author. 
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The Origins of Blair’s Foreign Policy 
Tony Blair became the leader of the Labour Party in July 1994 after 
a sudden death of his predecessor John Smith in May and the following 
leadership elections. Tony Blair was the youngest party leader ever 
elected and probably the least traditional as well. This deviation from the 
traditional beliefs of the Labour Party is characterised in the desire to 
reform. The desire to change basically everything started with reviewing 
Clause IV of Labour Party constitution. Clause IV contained a very strong 
statement of traditional socialistic belief. This was not what characterised 
Labour Party anymore. In the battle to win the next General Election a 
new fresh start needed to be made. The party needed to come closer to 
middle-class British citizens; the citizens that had the real power to 
determine elections. From the desire to reform and change the refreshed 
and renewed Labour Party was born – New Labour.1 
The Parliament was dissolved on April 8th 1997 and the date for the 
general election was set on May 1st 1997.2 In this General Election the 
Labour Party won by a landslide. After eighteen years of Conservative 
government a new fresh start was expected by almost everyone. This 
victory was not remarkable only for the big majority of seats won by the 
Labour Party, but also for what later appeared to be a start of a 'New 
Labour Decade'. Until 1997, the Labour Party had lost four elections in a 
row and had never won two consecutive full terms. For Tony Blair himself 
this was breaking new ground because he had never served in office 
before. Being a Prime Minister was his first and only occupation in 
                                         
1
 HINMAN, Bonnie. Tony Blair: Modern World Leaders. New York: Chelsea House, 
2007, p. 56-61. 
2
 GAY, Oonagh – WHITE, Isobel. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. Election 
timetables: Research paper 07/31. London: Parliament and Constitution Centre, 2007, 
p. 12. 
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government.3 The Labour Party won the elections based on its manifesto 
New Labour, New Life for Britain. The manifesto focused mainly on five 
specific pledges – education, crime, health, jobs and economic stability.4  
Tony Blair has applied a new style of premiership with its features. 
The fundamental change was concerning the working groups – he tended 
to work with circles of confidants and advisers, regarding cabinet and 
formal meetings as often unproductive. The other feature was spending 
less time in the House of Commons. The most visible change was 
reflected in taking more time to manage the media and appear live on 
television; which turned up to be crucial for all the public presentations, 
specifically those on the international stage.5 
Tony Blair came to office with completely zero experience of foreign 
affairs. This statement is hard to believe nowadays. Probably it is due to 
the fact that almost all politicians have their election campaigns based on 
domestic issues. And as a consequence of globalised world, when the 
newly elected politicians come to the office, they simply need to be better 
informed about and more involved in what is happening abroad.6  
Blair’s zero experience at the beginning was illustrated also in the 
fact that during the General Election campaign Tony Blair gave only one 
single speech on foreign policy.  He saw the foreign sector as the least 
important part of the manifesto. We may argue that it was due to his lack 
                                         
3
 BLAIR, Tony. A Journey: My Political Life. London: The Random House Group, 2010, 
p. 7. 
4
 LABOUR PARTY. History of the Labour Party: New Labour. Retrieved from: 
http://www.labour.org.uk/historyofthelabourparty3. 2012-03-31. 
5
 KAVANAGH, Dennis. The Blair premiership. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). Blair’s 
Britain 1997-2007. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3-15. 
6
 KAVANAGH, Dennis. The Blair premiership. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). Blair’s 
Britain 1997-2007. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3-15. 
 13 
 
of knowledge. In 1995, a year after he took the lead of the Labour Party, 
Tony Blair engaged Jonathan Powell even more to work closely with him 
and his team.7  
Before joining Tony Blair, Jonathan Powell had been a British 
diplomat for sixteen years, present for example at the Zimbabwe 
independence negotiations, the accession of Portugal to the European 
Union (EU) and the negotiations with China on the return of Hong Kong. 
He was the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington in 1991, 
when he followed the campaign trails of the main candidates. At that time 
it was George H. W. Bush running on behalf of the Republican Party and 
Bill Clinton for the Democratic Party. During this stay Powell became 
close to President Clinton and his staff whom he introduced to the leaders 
of New Labour.8  
By the time it was almost clear that the Conservatives would not 
win the upcoming General Election, Tony Blair decided to improve on this 
very lack of knowledge. Jonathan Powell organised highly secret and 
discreet meetings to introduce the main problems of diplomacy and 
current international events to the future Prime Minister. To help to tackle 
those tasks and to share their views upon them, distinguished former 
diplomats and academics were invited to such meetings. For illustration, 
we can mention several permanent members of those meetings - Sir 
David Hannay, who served as former British ambassador to the United 
Nations and became a life peer in 2001;9 Timothy Garton Ash, who is a 
                                         
7
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 4. 
8
 THE LONDON SPEAKER BUREAU. Economics & Political Speakers: Jonathan 
Powell. Retrieved from: http://www.londonspeakerbureau.in/jonathan_powell.aspx. 
2012-03-31. 
9
 UK PARLIAMENT WEBSITE. Lords: The Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG. Retrieved 
from: http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/david-hannay/2167. 2012-03-31. 
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well known historian and commentator concerned with the contemporary 
history of Europe;10 and as the last example – Sir Lawrence Freedman, 
who is a professor of War Studies at the King’s College London. He is 
also known as a member of official inquiry into Iraq War nowadays.11 Blair 
was really trying to educate himself. But on the other hand, he tried to 
make sure that foreign affairs would not come up as an issue during the 
campaign.12  
One thing we can be sure of is that even though Tony Blair’s 
knowledge base was insufficient, he always knew which people to take 
into the team to provide such knowledge. In this way he was a leader who 
picked his team and let it work without interruptive ideas. He offered 
political advisers, intellectuals and scholars the opportunity to engage in 
his team. For the most visible position - the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, he appointed Robin Cook.13 
Robin Cook was a long time Member of Parliament representing 
Labour Party – he became MP in 1974. During the Conservative 
government he held various posts in the Official Opposition Shadow 
Cabinet. He was the opposition spokesman for the Treasury and 
economic affairs, the spokesman on Health and social security, the 
spokesman on Trade and industry. Apart from his minister duty, he 
                                         
10
 TIMOTHY GARTON ASH. Biography. Retrieved from: 
http://www.timothygartonash.com/biography.html. 2012-03-31. 
11
 KING´S COLLEGE LONDON. Professors. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/freedman.aspx.20
12-03-31. 
12
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 10-11. 
13
 HILL, Christopher. Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair’s foreign policy mission. In: 
SELDON, Anthony – KAVANGH, Dennis (eds.). The Blair Effect 2001-2005: A Wasted 
Term? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 385. 
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became the Leader of the House of Commons in 2001. He resigned from 
all his positions in 2003. This issue will be discussed later in the thesis.14  
It is customary that Cabinets and governments have frequent 
meetings to discuss current situation, measures to be taken and further 
steps. Such meetings were held also by Blair’s Cabinet. But at the 
beginning of the New Labour government little attention was paid to 
foreign issues. Neither Jonathan Powell, nor Robin Cook could have 
expressed their views on the international stage. As was mentioned 
above, Tony Blair had very good instincts on people he worked with. It 
makes more sense when we look deeper into the foreign policy making in 
Britain of that time. With the Cabinet not really interested in international 
affairs, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had it quite easy to push his 
ideas about foreign policy through the Cabinet. However, the ideas were 
not always the best ones and controversy was a frequently used word to 
address Robin Cook.15 
The first public expression, in which Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) shared the view on foreign policy was made on May 12th 
1997. Robin Cook presented the mission statement. In his speech, the 
Foreign Secretary set a new agenda focusing on four main targets – 
security, prosperity, quality of life and mutual respect. The aim was also 
to keep the UK as the key player in international relations.16 What is most 
remembered from the mission statement is the stress Robin Cook put on 
'ethical dimension of foreign policy'. He stated that '...our foreign policy 
must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other 
                                         
14
 A&E TELEVISION NETWORK. Biography: Robin Cook. 2012. Retrieved from: 
http://www.biography.com/people/robin-cook-9255974. 2012-03-31. 
15
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 14. 
16
 DICKIE, John. The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works. London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2004, p. 83. 
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peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The 
Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign 
policy…'17 
The statement of FCO was not exactly what the Prime Minister had 
expected. Cook’s opinion that arms should not be sold to regimes that are 
planning any kind of aggression using them was strongly projected in the 
statement. The speech was meant to aim at the ongoing Indonesia-East 
Timor dispute. The tricky part was that since the times of the 
Conservative government, the UK had become the biggest arm supplier 
to Indonesia and its dictatorship led by President Suharto. And Tony Blair 
was not really willing to change it any little, at least in the beginning. This 
was mainly because it is never a good idea to make the lobbyists angry, 
especially not the ones from the arms industry.18  
How much Tony Blair was unhappy with Robin Cook’s steps was 
shown only few months later. On November 11th 1997 he gave his first 
major speech on foreign policy at the Mansion House. That was the time 
for him to express his priorities, not Cook’s.19  
One of the goals was to put Britain at the heart of the EU, including 
British entry to the single currency. The EU was waiting excitingly for the 
change of government in Britain. At the time of Conservative government 
                                         
17
 THE GUARDIAN. Robin Cook's speech on the government's ethical foreign 
policy: The speech by Robin Cook that started it all. 1997-05-12. Retrieved from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy/print. 
2012-03-31. 
18
 THE GUARDIAN. The International Arms Trade to Indonesia. 1999-09-09. Retrieved 
from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy/print. 
2012-03-31. 
19
 LUNN, Jon – MILLER, Vaughne – SMITH, Ben. HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY. British foreign policy since 1997: Research Paper 08/56. London: 
International Affairs and Defence Section, 2008, p. 20. 
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Britain was characterised as a partner hard to deal with within the EU. It 
was very unlikely that the newly selected Labour government would 
continue the Conservative policy towards Europe. New Labour did not 
perceive the process of European integration as an obstacle, but rather 
as an instrument helping to achieve further goals.20  
There was also the case of the phenomenon of the 'Special 
Relationship' between the United States of America (US) and the UK. It 
was first mentioned by Winston Churchill towards Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
1941 and it has represented strong transatlantic cooperation ever since.21 
For every British Prime Minister it has meant a different thing. The 
'Special Relationship' could be based on common ideology or personal 
relationship. In the early years of Blair’s premiership, it was both for him. 
Bill Clinton was the president of the US between 1993 and 2001.22 As a 
member of the Democratic Party, he was supposed to be close to Blair 
ideologically. Blair was astonished not only by Clinton’s centre-left 
politics, but also by his personality. The two statesmen had met several 
times before the Labour victory in 1997. The first official visit of President 
Clinton took place on May 29th 1997. That was a considerably early visit 
for the diplomatic procedure. It was seen as a keen gesture towards 
reinstating of the relations after the reserved relations during Major’s 
Conservative government.23  
                                         
20
 VÁŠKA, Jan. Kontinuity a diskontinuity evropské politiky New Labour. Praha: Fakulta 
sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy, 2009, p. 4-5. 
21
 DICKIE, John. The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works. London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2004, p. 2. 
22
 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. Presidents: 42. Bill Clinton. Retrieved from:: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/williamjclinton. 2012-03-31. 
23
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 9-13. 
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From the previous two goals we can derive that the goal to act as a 
bridge between Europe and the US was very hard to reach. Timothy 
Garton Ash describes this as the Janus Britain, after the Roman two-
faced god Janus. He claims that Britain is trying to have not two, but four 
faces – island, world, Europe and America. He sees a valid point in the 
fact that both Europe and America are signs of western modernity. This is 
also represented in Britain’s membership in the European Union on one 
side, and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
on the other.24 What Blair also stressed out was that Britain should 
become a proactive country that should use its western democratic 
values and promote them internationally.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
24
 ASH, Timothy Garton. Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity 
of Our Time. London: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 16-53. 
25
 CLARKE, Michael. Foreign Policy. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). Blair’s Britain 1997-
2007. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 600. 
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Iraq I 
The first situation that questioned the statements of proclaimed new 
foreign policy of the UK conducted by the Labour government was the 
bombing of Iraq in late 1998. This armed conflict was the first one out of 
five that Britain was engaged in under the Labour government.  
The dispute in Iraq had been going on since the liberation of Kuwait 
in 1991. The UN Security Council had passed several resolutions 
concerning the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. In Resolution 678 the Security 
Council authorised acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. 
Thus, it allowed the use of all necessary means to maintain peace.26  
The UN gave Iraq the deadline until January 15th 1991 to withdraw 
its forces out of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein ignored the deadline, so the 
international community has launched the operation Desert Storm. The 
operation was led by the US and it had support of twenty-nine countries 
which was large number at that time. And it was a huge success of the 
US and its allies. The operation was quick and effective from its 
beginning. It started on January 17th 1991 and finished on February 28th 
1991 when Iraq accepted the ceasefire. The UK sent the largest 
contingent of all the US allies to Iraq. The Labour Party, as the opposition, 
was formally backing the operation.27  
Almost immediately after Iraq accepted the ceasefire, uprisings 
began to spread from dissident areas in the north and south of Iraq. The 
rebellions were launched by the suppressed minorities of Kurds and Shi´a 
Muslims. The uprisings were doomed to brutal crackdown partly because 
                                         
26
 UNITED NATIONS. Security Council Resolutions - 1990: Resolution 678: Iraq-
Kuwait (29 November). 1990-11-29. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm. 2012-04-08. 
27
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 19-21. 
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of the unfulfilled promises of the allies. After the ceasefire the UN also 
required all the weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles to 
be handed in. Hussein’s regime never really fulfilled this demand, thus 
Iraq became the subject of weapons inspection programme. Also no-fly 
zones were established over Iraq to protect the minorities that started the 
rebellions from brutal actions of Hussein’s forces.28 
The problem with the no-fly zones was that they were not 
authorised by the UN, unlike the military campaign to get Iraqi forces out 
of Kuwait. The UN Security Council imposed several sets of sanctions on 
Iraq during the 1990´s but never authorised the no-fly zones specifically. 
The allies claimed that their actions were in accordance of the Resolution 
688 adopted on April 5th 1991. But this resolution did not authorise acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It did not mention that all necessary 
means could be used. The allies argued that the no-fly zones were more 
than necessary to protect the civilians.29 
This was quite a game-changing position of the allies. At the 
beginning of the new world order after the Cold War it brought a new 
question of sovereignty to the international relations. In 1990´s the debate 
over the meaning of the term sovereignty started. As the situation on the 
international stage evolved, it became clearer that a change had been in 
process. It became more evident that the sovereignty of a state can be 
disrupted in order to protect human rights of civilians. And that is what the 
allies operated with. 
                                         
28
 BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. Mid-East: Iraq Profile. 2001-01-10. 
Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763. 2012-04-08. 
29
 BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. Middle East: No-fly zones: The Legal 
Position. 2001-02-19. Retrieved from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm. 2012-04-08. 
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As was mentioned above, the United Nations imposed several sets 
of sanctions on Hussein’s Iraq during the 1990s. In the history of the 
United Nations it was the most complex set of sanctions ever imposed on 
a state. The main impact of the sanctions was that they affected import 
and export of all commodities and products, namely oil and military 
equipment. Those sanctions were reviewed every six months. But they 
did not have the demanded effect and the situation of civilians was not 
getting better.30  
Thus in 1995 the UN gave a green light to partial resumption of oil 
for Iraq. This was not the first attempt to launch such action but the 
previous attempts were declined by the Iraqi government. On April 14th 
1995 the Security Council adopted Resolution 986 establishing the so-
called oil-for-food programme.31 The programme was providing the 
possibility to sell Iraqi oil and hereby cover the purchase of humanitarian 
goods in order to meet the humanitarian needs of civilians. From its 
announcement in 1995 it took another year to actually launch the 
programme. The delay was caused by difficulties that occurred during 
negotiations of details between the Iraqi government and the United 
Nations. The programme was directed mainly on the food sector, health 
sector, transportation and agriculture.32  
                                         
30
 DODD, Tom – YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. The Iraq 
Crisis: Research Paper 98/28. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 
1998, p. 7. 
31
 UNITED NATIONS. Security Council Resolution  986 (1995) on authorization to 
permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a 
temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. 1995-04-14. 
Retrieved from: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement. 2012-04-
08. 
32
 UNITED NATIONS. Office of the Iraq Programme: Oil-for-Food. Retrieved from: 
http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/index.html. 2012-04-08. 
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The situation in Iraq hit another bump in September 1996. 
Hussein’s forces performed attacks towards the minority of Kurds in the 
north of the country. The US and the UK answered with air strikes and the 
extension of the no-fly zone in the northern part of the country. That was 
the last major military action performed by Britain under the Conservative 
government.33 
Simultaneously, with the change of the government of the UK the 
rhetoric of some of the allies started to change. Some of the states 
wanted to start the process of getting things back to normal in Iraq, 
especially those concerning the trade. This process had to be followed by 
lifting of the sanctions. The US and the UK were strictly opposing such 
intentions. The reason the two powers gave was that the regime in Iraq 
could not be trusted in the question of weapons of mass destruction.34  
The unwillingness to allow complete investigation of any kind of 
programme to develop chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic weapons 
on the territory of Iraq was the main issue causing the non-decreasing 
level of anger from the allies towards Iraq. To maintain the control over 
such programmes, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq 
(UNSCOM) was established on April 3rd 1991, by the adoption of 
Resolution 687. The commission consisted of experts on weapons. 
Except from investigation and inspections, the commission was 
authorised to destroy, remove or render harmless all items specified in 
the resolution 687.35  
                                         
33
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 19-21. 
34
 DODD, Tom – YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. The Iraq 
Crisis: Research Paper 98/28. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 
1998, p. 7-9. 
35
 UNITED NATIONS. Security Council Resolutions – 1991: Resolution 687: Iraq-
Kuwait (3 Apr). 1991-04-03. Retrieved from: http://daccess-dds-
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According to the commission reports it destroyed quite a number of 
different kinds of weapons. However, the Iraqi government was not fully 
cooperating with UNSCOM. The commission had to face denial or 
restrictions of access to conduct the investigation of suspicious materials. 
Thus the full extent of weapon programmes in Iraq remained uncertain.36  
The attitude of Iraq towards warnings from the United Nations or 
the allies started to be indigestible at the end of 1997. On January 31st 
1998 Robin Cook and his US opposite number, Madeleine Albright, 
announced at a joint press conference that compliance with Iraq was vital 
for the stability in the region. Unless such behaviour was to be seen from 
Iraqi side, military action could be a possible result of such non-
compliance.37  
The diplomatic solution of the dispute was, however, the desirable 
result of the situation. In the middle of February 1998, Kofi Annan, the UN 
Secretary General, went to see Saddam Hussein in Iraq. His mission 
there was simple: To communicate to Hussein that this was his last 
chance to obey the United Nations demands. If not, this failure would lead 
to military action. Hussein assured Annan that the situation will improve. 
But Hussein’s words once again proved to be empty.38 
Although the cooperation between Iraq and UNSCOM was working 
for a while, in October Hussein broke the agreement again. The US and 
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the UK were realising that some form of military action had to be carried 
out. For Blair it was about to be the first military action as the Prime 
Minister. In this situation he had to be careful with jumping to conclusions. 
He was afraid of the reaction of the public and even more of the reaction 
of the Labour Party members. Concerning the international community, 
the US and the UK stood alone on the side of armed action. Neither the 
allies such as France, nor the Security Council were willing to authorise 
such actions.39 
The attack was planned on November 15th 1998. The Secretary 
General has sent a personal letter stating the situation to Hussein.  A few 
hours before the planned action a response arrived form Hussein 
agreeing to greater compliance. The planned strikes had to be stopped to 
give Hussein a chance to prove him right. Once again they were only 
empty promises.40 
The final decision to launch attacks was made. The only question 
was when. The holy month of Ramadan was about to start on December 
20th 1998. During this month any armed action was inconceivable. The 
operation Desert Fox was due to be executed between December 16th 
and December 19th 1998. As the targets, places where Iraq refused to 
cooperate with UNSCOM were chosen. By the time of the attacks it was 
only Britain and the US to take part in the bombing of Baghdad.41  
The aims of the conducted bombing were: 'To degrade Saddam 
Hussein's ability to make and to use weapons of mass destruction. To 
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diminish Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war against his neighbours. 
To demonstrate to Saddam Hussein the consequences of violating 
international obligations.'42 Both the US and the UK claimed that the main 
aim was not to destabilise the regime. Critics argue that this was exactly 
the aim, pointing out that nearly half of the targets were governmentally 
connected.43 It is questionable whether those goals were fulfilled. Iraq 
was contained, but only for a little while. If the operation had really been 
successful, the powers would not have felt the need to come back to Iraq 
five years later.  
What had Tony Blair learnt from this first encounter with a military 
action? Certainly his self-esteem as a world leader had grown very much. 
Within a year, from a man with zero knowledge of foreign policy he had 
become a key world leading player. Not bad one wants to say. The 
situation in Iraq was a valuable lesson for Tony Blair. It should have 
prepared him for the four wars that were still about to come. We also 
learnt that Tony Blair was not afraid to push his policy through. Even 
though, the consequence of those actions could mean an armed conflict. 
By the intervention in Iraq Blair actually did accomplish what he had 
stated in his vision of the foreign policy - Britain became a proactive 
country and the 'Special Relationship' of the UK and the US got a new 
dimension. 
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Kosovo 
After the controversial and much discussed intervention in Iraq, 
Tony Blair became more engaged in world politics than in the previous 
years. He was now in the spotlight not only at home in Britain, but he 
became a person of public interest of the whole world. And the event that 
was about to strengthen this was to come in a few months. 
In the Balkans the situation was always tense. We can recall the 
events that preceded the World War I. During the Cold War the situation 
was relatively stable. The territory of Socialistic Republic of Serbia 
included two extensively autonomous provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
The province of Kosovo was inhabited mainly by Muslim ethnic-
Albanians. The Eastern Orthodox Serbs, however, saw Kosovo as the 
historic cradle of the Serbian nation. Thus, the dispute over Kosovo does 
not stay on strategic or economic background. It is based rather on 
historical, religious and emotional indicators. Those factors were even 
more deepened and politicised during the last centuries, with the raise of 
nationalism.44  
The Cold War had contained the disputes from bursting in many 
regions in the world. The situation in Kosovo was not any different. 
Relative stability was shattered by the death of Josip Tito in 1980. The 
tensions started to grow. The final strike against peace in the region was 
the Serbian presidential elections in 1989 and the victory of the leader of 
the Serbian communist party Slobodan Milosevic. He declared openly 
that the autonomy should be taken away from Kosovo and the Serbs 
should reinstate their dominance in the province. In 1990 a new Serbian 
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constitution was adopted and Kosovo and Vojvodina became regions 
within Serbia. The rights of ethnic-Albanians were suppressed. Following 
the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, the 
Kosovar Albanian parliament voted in favour of the independence of 
Kosovo in October 1991. Kosovo even appealed for recognition to the 
European Community in December 1991, but was rejected.45  
Despite the wars going on across the borders in Croatia and 
Bosnia, the situation remained relatively calm until the end of the year 
1995. The possible ticking bomb of Kosovo was a well known issue of 
international affairs. The conflict started to escalate in early 1996. An 
event that was seen as a backstabbing act in Kosovo was the recognition 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as a sovereign independent 
state in April 1996.  The newly recognised country consisted of 
Montenegro and Serbia. Beginning with 1996, the attacks between 
ethnic-Albanians and Serbs intensified and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) started to appear publicly. The KLA conducted sporadic attacks 
against Serbian police and state officials as a response to continued 
suppression by the central government. In early 1998 Serbian authorities 
executed a series of massacres in villages in Kosovo.46  As a response, 
the UN Security council has adopted Resolution 1160 stating that the UN 
are condemning Serbian actions towards Kosovar Albanians. The 
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resolution has also established a 'comprehensive arms embargo on the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'.47  
As the conflict continued to grow in Kosovo, also the situation on 
the international stage was getting hotter. The Contact Group that was 
originally created for the conflict in Bosnia in 1995 turned its attention 
towards Kosovo. The group consisted of the US, the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation. The Contact Group openly 
called the KLA a terrorist organisation, but at the same time did not 
approve actions of Milosevic’s regime.48 
Compared to the situation in Iraq and the response of the 
international community, Kosovo was a completely different case. It 
shared some similarities with Iraq – the governing regime was 
suppressing the minority and it had been an ongoing dispute. But the 
differences are the most important in this case. The dispute over Kosovo 
was classified as an internal dispute. The FRY was a recognised and 
sovereign state. Kosovo was a part of the republic in the international 
point of view and the governing regime was using excessive power 
against the inhabitants of Kosovo. But was this a matter for the 
international community to solve? And most importantly, the FRY was not 
representing an international threat, unlike Iraq. The FRY has never 
declared any intension to use its powers against any other sovereign 
state. As it was already mentioned, the conflict was not based on 
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strategic grounds, but rather historical. Thus the international powers 
hesitated to take any military actions towards the Serbs. They simply 
could not find the right argument to justify such action. What they did was 
trying to solve it with diplomacy, not with force. 
From the beginning, the Russian representatives declared that they 
would not support any resolution in the UN Security Council that would 
give a mandate for a military action. In autumn 1998, after series of 
bloody cruelness took place, the Russian representatives changed their 
rhetoric a bit. They hinted that they still would not vote in favour of this 
operation, but militarily they would not stay in the way. That was a game-
changer. That was the statement that NATO was waiting for. The 
justification and authorisation was granted. Particularly the British FCO 
lawyers were concerned about the legal implications of such actions, 
keeping in mind the problems that were occurring in Iraq’s case.49  
In 1998 there was still the bitter question whether it is necessary to 
have an organisation such as NATO after the end of the Cold War. The 
Americans were aware that it was always them who risk their lives, not 
their European partners. Tony Blair was as well keen on the Americans 
risking lives for the Europeans. And he wanted to show the US that 
Europe can do more. It was according to his statement – Britain should 
maintain the bridge between the US and Europe. Kosovo should have 
been the case of proving it.  
In the light of the worsening situation, NATO increased the 
pressure on Milosevic’s regime. At the same time, diplomatic solutions 
were trying to be made with the help of the US Special Envoy Richard 
Holbrooke. In October 1998 NATO authorised the air strikes against the 
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FRY but Milosevic decided to obtain the demands of the international 
community.50 The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1203 on 
October 24th 1998 approving the agreement reached but not giving NATO 
the explicit mandate for a military action.51  
In early 1999 the international community lost its patience with the 
ongoing massacres. In February there was one last attempt to maintain 
peace. It was the UK and France who chaired the meetings between the 
Serbs and the Albanians. Despite the deadline to reach the agreement 
several times, the outcome of those meetings was virtually zero. The 
alliance was getting ready to act. NATO claimed that humanitarian 
necessity constituted sufficient basis for a military action. The plan was to 
conduct similar action as in the case of Iraq.52  
On March 24th 1999 the operation Allied Force was launched. 
NATO executed air strikes against the military forces of the FRY. NATO 
has communicated specific conditions that FRY had to meet to stop the 
air strikes. The demands were following: '... a verifiable end to all Serb 
military actions and the immediate end of violence and repression; the 
withdrawal of all Milosevic’s military police and paramilitary forces; the 
stationing in Kosovo of an international military force; the unconditional 
and safe return of refugees and internally-displaced persons; unhindered 
access for the humanitarian relief organisations; and finally, the credible 
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assurance of a willingness to work towards a political framework based 
on the Rambouillet Agreement.. '53  
The first reaction to the strikes from the international community 
was disconcerted. Within the UN Security Council, Russia and China 
were strictly against. Russia even prepared a resolution demanding to 
stop the strikes but it was not adopted in the end. Russia froze relations 
with NATO and called for armed assistance to help the FRY. The UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan showed regret that diplomacy had failed. 
He also stated that sometimes force needs to be used to maintain peace. 
That was what NATO was invoking to.54  
The original assumption was that the strikes will last similar amount 
of time as the strikes against Iraq. The alliance was counting on the fact 
that the strikes would teach the FRY a lesson. And another round of 
negotiation would be possible afterwards. But the FRY armed forces only 
intensified their actions towards ethnic-Albanians. Milosevic’s regime was 
executing their idea of ethnic cleansing. NATO forces were conducting 
strictly air strikes. Neither President Clinton, nor Prime Minister Blair was 
eager to sent troops of soldiers directly to Kosovo to fight the Serbs. The 
allies did not want to fight war of anybody else. But in the light of the 
horrors Tony Blair decided he would send British troops to Kosovo. Blair 
needed support from the US on this. President Clinton remained 
unyielding. He did not want to risk American lives on the field.55 
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Blair took the responsibility for the ground attacks on his own back. 
He was lobbying for support everywhere he could. Blair flew to the US in 
April 1999. And there, in Chicago, on April 22 he gave one of his major 
speeches. In Chicago he formulated his ideas in the doctrine of the 
international community. He expressed the idea of mutual dependence. In 
his eyes the states are all part of the international community and could 
not ignore when violation of human rights is happening somewhere, even 
though it is an inner conflict. In a case like this the international 
community should proceed with liberal interventionism. This principally 
meant that in cases of crimes against humanity, intervention is a positive 
legitimate moral obligation of the international community.56 However, this 
humanitarian intervention should be guided by answers to the questions 
that Tony Blair specified as: ' Are we sure of our case? Have we 
exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can 
sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long-term? Do 
we have national interests involved?'57 
To support his agenda, Tony Blair and his wife went to see a 
refugee camp in May. After he saw the situation on his own, the horrible 
condition of the refugees, he was determined more than ever that 
Milosevic’s regime needed to be taken down for good. The idea that Blair 
had was that if diplomacy was needed to work, it had to be supported by 
force. Simultaneously with his personal campaign of victory of the good, 
negotiations with FRY were held. But they were held without the British 
presence. It was Russian, American and EU diplomats who were present 
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at the meetings. The Serbs agreed to withdraw from Kosovo on June 9th 
1999. The air strikes conducted by NATO stopped the following day. 
Instead of few days, the operation lasted seventy-eight days.58    
Concerning the military point of view, the operation 'Allied Force' 
was a huge success. Only two NATO pilots were lost in the battle. A lot of 
the FRY military equipment was destroyed. From the humanitarian point 
of view, the operation caused a huge humanitarian crisis in the region. 
Hundreds of thousands ethnic-Albanians were turned into refugees due to 
ethnic cleansings. The return of the refugees was the most important part 
of the post-conflict resolution carried out by the NATO Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) mission. KFOR peacekeeping troops were deployed in Kosovo in 
June 1999.59  
For Tony Blair personally, the Kosovo experience meant a key 
factor in his view of international order. He took personally the scenes he 
saw in Kosovo and felt that they could have been prevented. The 
proclaimed doctrine of international community provided a framework for 
the future. With the different opinions in the UN Security Council there 
was a need for arguments how to justify military actions without the 
specific mandate from the UN. Tony Blair saw the concept of 
humanitarian interventions as the right reason how to justify those 
actions. Since Kosovo, Blair did believe that the use of force is a 
legitimate measure taken to solve disputes in the name of protecting 
human rights. 
 
                                         
58
 KAMPFNER, John. Blair’s Wars. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 50-57. 
59
 YOUNGS, Tim – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. Kosovo: 
KFOR and Reconstruction: Research Paper 99/66. London: International Affairs and 
Defence Section, 1999, p. 8-15. 
 34 
 
Sierra Leone 
Another humanitarian intervention Tony Blair dragged Britain into 
was the dispute in Sierra Leone. The dispute was based mainly on the 
control of the diamond business. The conflict in Sierra Leone started in 
March 1991, when members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led 
by Foday Sankoh started armed fighting in eastern part of the country. 
This had to lead to the fall of that time government. That time legitimate 
government fought against the rebels with the help of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). But the 
following year, on April 29th 1992, Captain Strasser ousted President 
Joseph Momoh in a military coup.60 Even though there was a change of 
the government, the RUF armed forces continued the fighting. In 
February 1995 the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali appointed a Special Envoy Berhamu Dinka from Ethiopia. The 
Envoy collaborated closely with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
and ECOWAS in order to negotiate peace and bring the legislative 
framework back to the country.61  
One of the tasks was also to organise parliamentary and 
presidential elections. The elections were held in February 1996 and 
resulted in the victory of Sierra Leone People’s Party led by Ahmed Tejan 
Kabbah. Those elections were funded mainly by the UK. The problem 
was that members of the RUF were not participating in the elections; 
therefore they did not recognise the elections and the results. The Special 
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Envoy helped to negotiate the Abidjan Peace Agreement. Despite the 
negotiations, the agreement failed. The RUF united with the military junta 
and performed another coup in May 1997. President Kabbah and the 
government were forced to leave for exile in Guinea. Without the help of 
Western countries Sierra Leone had to rely on the regional power of 
Nigeria. It was not the best solution to choose. Nigeria itself was 
sanctioned for violation of human rights. Tony Blair was in favour of 
restoring the legitimate President Kabbah in power. He trusted Robin 
Cook to able to handle this situation as a Foreign Secretary.62  
Meanwhile, tensions between the two sides were increasing. On 
October 8th 1997 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132. This 
resolution introduced oil and arms embargo on Sierra Leone. The 
resolution also authorised the deployment of ECOMOG troops to help 
maintain the embargo.63 The embargo was imposed on both the RUF and 
the legitimate government. But the FCO of Britain was secretly violating 
the embargo by supporting the legitimate government in its attempts to 
return to power. Tony Blair was close to be furious when he learned this. 
His opinion on the situation was that even though mistakes had been 
made it was in the name of the legal government. It was the classical 
example of conducting the ethical policy for Tony Blair.64    
In February 1998 ECOMOG has launched a response attack 
against the junta. As the result of the successful attack the junta was 
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removed from the capital, Freetown, and President Kabbah was returned 
to office on March 10th 1998.65  
Foday Sankoh was captured and sentenced to death by the court in 
Sierra Leone. Among the Africans war criminals he had one of the worst 
reputations for violations of human rights. Robin Cook has interceded for 
amnesty on Sankoh´s behalf. He even took part in persuading President 
Kabbah to appoint Sankoh as the Minister for Natural Resources in July 
1999. That was the result of the peace accord signed in Lome, Togo. The 
appointment practically made Sankoh in charge of the diamond mines. It 
was not surprising that very soon Sankoh returned to his previous 
behaviour.66  
On October 22nd 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1270 authorising the establishment of the United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was the biggest peacekeeping 
mission conducted by the UN at that time.67 However, the troops were 
consisting of Western soldiers. The mission did not receive enough 
sources; and members of the mission did not have much experience with 
such operations. With the increasing violence in Sierra Leone, the 
mission was not able to manage the situation.68  
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Thus in on February 7th 2000 the mission was extended by the 
adoption of Resolution 1289. The resolution added new tasks for the 
mission: 'To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, 
in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports. To 
facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance 
along specified thoroughfares. To provide security in and at all sites of the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. To coordinate 
with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities. To guard weapons, ammunition and 
other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assists in 
their subsequent disposal or destruction.'69 The important news for the 
mission was that the UN Security Council gave UNAMSIL the mandate to 
take any necessary actions to meet those tasks. This meant that the 
mission could act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.70  
 The toughest moment came in May 2000 when almost 500 UN 
soldiers were taken hostage by the RUF. The Ministry of Defence and the 
FCO persuaded Blair to send British troops to Sierra Leone. The tasks for 
the British troops were to maintain security at the airport until the UN 
reinforcements arrive and to help release hostages. After the UN 
hostages were released, British troops helped Kabbah´s army push the 
rebels out of the capital city.71 
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Public opinion of the involvement of Britain in the conflict was poor. 
Why should British soldiers risk their lives in a far away African country? It 
was never publicly revealed but politicians saw it as a heritage from the 
colonial era they need to deal with delicately. The official statement of the 
UK government was that British troops will stay in Sierra Leone only until 
the UNAMSIL reinforcements arrive. But in reality the UK mission has a 
long-term goal of establishing democratic order.72  
The unravelling situation in Sierra Leone did not help to improve the 
public opinion in Britain. On August 25th 2000 eleven British soldiers were 
kidnapped. Britain immediately launched a search operation called 
Operation Barras. In five days the armed forces West Side Boys agreed 
to exchange five soldiers for medical supplies and a satellite phone. The 
operation British troops found the camp of the rebels and tried to free the 
rest of the hostages. During the fights there was one casualty on the 
British side and almost thirty rebels were killed on the other side.73  
The last enlargement of the mission was approved on March 30th 
2001 by the adoption of Resolution 1346 by the UN Security Council. The 
main tasks of the mission prevailed and several new were added. 
UNAMSIL was ordered to assist the legitimate government of Sierra 
Leone. The primary goals were to help establish law and order, stabilise 
the situation in the country and guide it to independent elections.74 
UNAMSIL was ended by December 31st 2005. British troops withdrew 
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from Sierra Leone in July 2002 when the official end of the war was 
declared.75  
Unlike other missions Britain was dragged into under Blair’s 
premiership, Sierra Leone caused much less controversy. The mission 
was supported by several UN resolutions. And in the international 
community there was a wide consensus that this had to be done. The 
assessment of the mission by the international community was even 
better than expected. According to the UN statement, UNAMSIL can 
serve as an example of successful peacekeeping of new generation with 
the emphasis on peacebuilding. The whole mission including British 
troops helped with disarmament of thousands of rebels and helped with 
restoring governmental structures. The outcome of the mission was not 
only relatively successful stabilisation of the country but also the 
establishment of special tribunals dealing with war crimes.76 
Tony Blair himself proclaimed that the action in Sierra Leone was 
the military action he was the most proud of from all.77 It is no wonder that 
he says so, considering the controversy that all the other actions caused. 
In the case of Sierra Leone Tony Blair applied all the principles of his 
doctrine of international community and the ethical policy proclaimed by 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. This military action can be truly excused 
by the need to protect the human rights that were seriously violated. 
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Although this was a victorious example for Blair and Britain, his 
idea of the international community was not fulfilled enough. Blair’s 
interest in advocating human rights remained selective. But one thing 
remained the same; it can be argued that has even grown - Blair’s vision 
of him as a humanitarian warrior and his messianic tendencies. After the 
unpleasant feelings from Kosovo, Sierra Leone provided much needed 
boost of his personal concern. Sierra Leone gave Blair the 'blessing' to 
proceed with his foreign policy. 
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Afghanistan 
The year 2001 was truly life-changing for Tony Blair. First, his close 
friend Bill Clinton was replaced by George W. Bush as the President of 
the US on January 20th 2001.78 It was not a favourable change in Blair’s 
eyes. For what counts, Bush was from the Republican Party, what could 
he have in common with Blair’s and Clinton’s values? At the last official 
dinner Clinton and Blair had in London, President Clinton gave Blair a 
piece of advice: 'Don’t let your friendship with America wane, just 
because I’m gone.'79  
In spring 2001 Blair had to solve several crises on the domestic 
scene. It was a variety of issues, from political scandals to the livestock 
disease. Blair had to postpone the General Election from May to June 7th 
2001. The result of the election was not a surprise, although the turnout 
was quite small and the victory was not the same landslide as in 1997.80 
Blair started his second term in the office with several changes in the 
Cabinet. He offered Robin Cook the position of the Leader of the House 
of Commons. And Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, was offered the place 
of the Foreign Secretary. This decision was based on the common 
perception that Cook was rather hard to work with. And Blair did not 
favour how Cook conducted some aspects of the foreign policy without 
consulting him.81  
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The event that has affected the rest of Blair’s premiership took 
place on Tuesday September 11th 2001. Four US airplanes operating 
internal flights were hijacked by members of the terrorist organisation al-
Qaeda. Two planes crashed deliberately into the twin towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City. The third plane collided into Pentagon in 
Washington DC. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania after 
passengers of the plane tried to take control over the plane. The collision 
into Pentagon caused 180 lives and the collision in Pennsylvania caused 
44 lives on board of the aircraft. The situation in New York City was much 
worse. The towers successively collapsed burying the estimated number 
of 5, 000 people in the debris.82 
Tony Blair was in a hotel room preparing for his speech to the 
Trades Union Congress in Brighton when the first plane hit the World 
Trade Center. Shortly after he heard of the attack, he spoke to the 
delegates at the congress: 'There have been most terrible, shocking 
events taking place in the United States of America within the last hour or 
so, including two hijacked planes being flown deliberately into the World 
Trade Centre. I’m afraid we can only imagine the terror and the carnage 
there, and the many, many innocent people that will have lost their lives. I 
know that you would want to join with me in sending the deepest 
condolences to President Bush and to the American people on behalf of 
the British people at these terrible events.'83 
By the time of the collapse of the first tower, Blair was on his way 
back to London. Once there, he began emergency meetings with all 
members of the Cabinet and the intelligence agencies. The biggest 
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concern for all world leaders during the first hours after the attack was the 
safety of their respective territories and Blair was no exception. All 
defence facilities around the world, as well as the United Kingdom police, 
had been put on high alert. Financial and business institutions were 
advised about security measures.84 Blair offered British support to the US: 
'This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, 
but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, 
here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this 
hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from 
our world.'85  
One of the important gestures from the international community 
took place on September 12th 2001. For the first time in history NATO 
applied the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty86, known as the collective 
defence clause, saying that the terrorist attacks on the US represented 
attack on all NATO Member States. It was also the first time the reversed 
rhetoric appeared. The US was now in the position of the harmed state.87    
Soon it was obvious that Blair was not planning to end his support 
to the US only with words. Blair shared his views in the debate on 
international terrorism during the parliamentary recall on September 14th. 
He emphasised three urgent objectives in the light of the attacks, but did 
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not state a precise response. The three main objectives were: to bring to 
justice those responsible for the attacks; to form a common alliance 
against terrorism and maintain solidarity in support of any action; and to 
rethink the scale and nature of the action the world takes to combat 
terrorism to make it more effective.88 
In the following days and weeks Blair continued with 'standing 
shoulder to shoulder' with the US. He and Bush agreed that quick 
diplomatic moves are necessary. The allies needed support from the 
international community. A legal political framework needed to be set. 
They both started calling fellow leaders of the international community to 
help build a coalition of nations to combat terrorism – as President Bush 
articulated 'the war on terror'. Blair showed to be a very skilled negotiator. 
He travelled literally around the whole world to talk to state leaders. In the 
name of his proclaimed 'bridge' he really helped to connect the US to the 
rest of the world. In the light of his success as a negotiator, his messianic 
tendencies started to emerge again. The aim was no smaller than to build 
the new world order.89  
It became apparent that some kind of response action had to be 
taken. The questions were how soon, how strong and most importantly, 
against whom those actions should be taken. Blair and Bush were 
discussing whether the planned actions should be directed only on al-
Qaeda or whether they should, as well, include the Taleban that in fact 
ruled over Afghanistan. It was without question that the Taleban at least 
did not do anything to prevent al-Qaeda to operate from the Afghan 
territory. But the burning task was to resolve whether the Taliban could be 
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directly connected to the attacks on September 11. Blair and Bush 
decided to take a military action towards al-Qaeda. Although they 
confirmed that the Taleban is not directly linked to the attacks, they saw 
the potential removal of the Taleban from Afghanistan as a positive effect 
of the planned operation. What Blair insisted on involving in the operation 
was the 'ethical dimension'. It meant that the military action should also 
keep in mind the refugees and provide all the possible humanitarian help 
they need. The problem with such words was that those were purely 
Blair’s decisions during those days, not the Cabinet’s, not British, just 
Blair's. With his rising importance on the world stage Tony Blair was 
losing the need to consult others.90  
On October 7th 2001 the US and the UK started the military 
operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The allies reported their 
intention to the UN Security Council adverting to the Article 51 of the UN 
Charter about individual or collective self-defence. Both countries 
expressed their beliefs that risks to civilians were minimised by selecting 
proper targets. The main reason stated in favour of the need of such 
action was that al-Qaeda was likely to plan and execute further attacks 
and therefore it is a high threat for international security.91  
At the start of the campaign Tony Blair gave a speech at Downing 
Street. In the speech he stated about Endurance Freedom: 'There are 
three parts, all equally important, to the operation in which we are 
engaged -- military, diplomatic and humanitarian…The military action we 
are taking will be targeted against places we know to be involved in the 
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al-Qaeda network of terror or against the military apparatus of the 
Taliban. The military plan has been put together mindful of our 
determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties…On 
the diplomatic and political fronts, in the time I have been prime minister, I 
cannot recall a situation that has commanded so quickly such a powerful 
coalition of support -- not just from those countries directly involved in 
military action but from many others in all parts of the world…On the 
humanitarian front, we are assembling a coalition of support for refugees 
in and outside Afghanistan, which is as vital as the military coalition. Even 
before September 11, four million Afghans were on the move. There are 
two million refugees in Pakistan and one-and-a-half million in Iran.'92 
There is a visible 'ethical dimension' link through the whole speech. 
His vision of the 'humanitarian intervention' was also included when he 
talked about putting together a coalition to gather support for refugees. It 
is also visible that he stood by his presumption of Britain as 'the bridge' 
between the US and Europe, only here this point was enlarged to the 
bridge between the US and the rest of the world. Blair’s crusade for 
international democracy and justice continued in the embodiment of 
Afghanistan. 
Endurance Freedom involved air strikes and special forces 
operations. Afghan forces that were opposing the Taleban also took part 
in those actions. The Taleban fled Kabul on November 13th 2001 and 
their control of territory was quickly reduced to one major city, Kandahar, 
and a few outlying pockets. The surrender of Kandahar came on 
December 7th 2001. The UN fostered talks in Germany in order to help 
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with establishing an interim administration in Afghanistan while the search 
for Osama bin Laden and his operatives from al-Qaeda continued.93 
The military operation in Afghanistan was very quick, including the 
liberation of Kabul. Removing the Taleban from its power was not the 
biggest challenge the allies faced. That was helping the Afghan nation 
with the post-conflict reconstruction. That means restoring democratic 
structures in the country, rebuilding means of communication and 
removing the need of humanitarian help from the country. Until present 
days those goals have not been fulfilled. What was the international 
community able to secure in Afghanistan were adoption of a new 
constitution, presidential elections in 2004 and 2009 and the national 
Assembly elections in 2005.94 After almost ten years of chasing, Osama 
bin Laden was tracked down and subsequently killed on May 2nd 2011.95 
For Tony Blair the event became quite personal during the time. He 
could not understand the fact that some states will not want to help the 
US in the 'war of terror'. It was not understandable for him that some 
states will not participate in justice and change of regime that needed to 
be made in Afghanistan. In the first place, Afghanistan was not a case of 
humanitarian intervention for Blair, such as the previous conflicts were. It 
was the matter of justice. The words 'personal' and 'justice' characterised 
him from the event of Afghanistan on. 
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Iraq II 
After the September 11th attacks most states of the international 
community had deplored such terrorist attacks. But only few of them 
wanted to support or even engage in further military action. Tony Blair 
and George Bush were both aware that removing al-Qaeda from 
Afghanistan is just a start of the 'war on terror'. In his State of the Union 
address in January 2002, President Bush articulated his vision of the 
current axis of evil. He named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the states 
threatening international security. Tony Blair was convinced that the US 
was determined to take all necessary measures against Iraq. Tony Blair 
felt that there was no doubt whether the UK should support the US. His 
presumption was that also the European allies would be of the same 
opinion and the unity would help to achieve the UN mandate to conduct 
the military action. And the successful operation would be a memento for 
all states that intend to threaten the international security.96   
Contrary to Blair’s presumption, the world leaders were not in the 
favour of such strike against the Iraq. Their reasoning was that there was 
no absolute proof that Iraq and Saddam Hussein personally had played 
any direct role in the September 11th attacks. They also thought that the 
containment policies introduced in the 1990´s after the first dispute over 
Iraq were working. Prime Minister Blair and President Bush disagreed 
strongly and wanted to see some major changes done in Iraq, which 
included Hussein being ousted as president. Bush was certain that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction. Saddam had previously used 
chemical weapons on some of his own people, and it was commonly 
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believed that he also had biological weapons and was developing nuclear 
ones.97  
Tony Blair was concerned with Iraq and the situation long before 
President Bush was. But he supported diplomatic actions rather than 
military ones. The turning point came at the Crawford ranch in Texas in 
April 2002. Blair went to see Bush at his ranch to talk out the situation in 
Iraq. After this meeting it was clear that nothing stood in the way of Bush 
and his plan. The question was not anymore whether there will be a war. 
It was now when and how is the war going to be fought. Blair was set and 
ready to start another round of negotiations similar as he did in the case 
of Afghanistan. He also started to prepare the public on a military 
intervention.98  
The tension over war built through the Summer of 2002. Blair 
visited Bush in early September and did not persuade Bush to back down 
from planned military action. Blair supported the US Instead, but asked 
him to proceed in accordance with the UN. Blair wanted the UN Security 
Council to pass a resolution calling for Saddam Hussein to allow weapons 
inspectors back into Iraq as it was in the 1990´s. The problem with Bush 
was that his advisors were appealing to him to avoid the UN resolution if 
possible. Blair’s position was that any kind of military action in Iraq 
needed the approval of the international community.99  
Bush and Blair came to an agreement. The US would pursue the 
diplomatic solution if the measures taken by the UN bring disarmament of 
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Iraq. Blair’s response was that the UK would go to the war alongside the 
US if the UN measures fail to work. Afterwards Blair published the 
intelligence findings about the presence of weapons of mass destruction 
on the territory of Iraq. He did that to show the public that there really is 
something to worry about. He was also counting with the fact that if the 
people knew the information in forehand, it would be easier to justify the 
possible action.100  
Blair was very relieved when Bush went before the UN on 
September 12th 2002 and delivered a speech in which he asked the 
Security Council to pass a new resolution. The resolution was calling for 
Hussein to allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq.101  
After a difficult negotiating, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1441 on November 8th 2002. The resolution stated that 
Hussein had one final opportunity to comply with the UN by letting 
inspectors back into Iraq to make sure that there were not any weapons 
of mass destruction. The resolution had a problematic part. There were 
not included specific measures to be taken if Iraq would not comply or 
even how to measure its compliance. It was not clear whether a second 
resolution was needed in such case. Or whether was it automatic to take 
a military action if the Resolution 1441 would not be obeyed by Iraq.102 
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Experts from the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) arrived to Iraq on November 25th 2002. According the Resolution 
1441 in thirty day was Hussein due to hand over a report on the arsenal 
of Iraq. On December 7th Iraq really did issue the report of 12,159 pages. 
It was handed over to the UN and IAEA experts. The experts claimed that 
it would take weeks to go through the documents and to verify the 
information. The report was containing mostly old information, or the 
information that was known from public sources or intelligence. The report 
did not include any paper work that Hussein got rid of the chemical and 
biological weapons that used to be possessed by Iraq. But on the other 
hand, the report also did not include any evidence that there actually are 
any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The main question everyone 
wanted an answer was whether Hussein had complied or hadn’t. Bush 
and Blair held similar opinions. And even if they did not, back in April Blair 
promised Bush that Britain would stay loyal to the US. Tony Blair felt like 
Saddam Hussein had his last change and he misspent it.103  
By January 2003 the United States was insisting that Hussein had 
failed in compliance that was required. The United States started to ship 
troops and materials to the Middle East in order to prepare for military 
action. The US articulated that it needed help from Britain on the political 
level rather than on the military one. One of Blair’s clearest goals during 
this time was to maintain the international alliance that Resolution 1441 
had supposedly created. However, France and Germany had begun to 
pull back, and the relative vagueness of the resolution itself was not 
helpful. Blair wanted Bush to support a second resolution in the UN 
Security Council that would authorise military consequences for 
noncompliance on Iraq’s side: He also wanted more time to convince 
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Hussein to step down and time to prepare British public on the event of 
war. Bush was not able to give Blair clear promises to his demands. 
Meanwhile Blair used every bit of his negotiating skills to build a majority 
within the UN Security Council that would be in favour of passing another 
resolution on the matter of Iraq. He also did everything he could to 
persuade his own Labour Party members to support a possible 
intervention in Iraq. For the first time in his political career, Blair found it 
difficult to bring others to his point of view.104  
In early March 2003 the chief of the UN experts in Iraq claimed that 
Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but more time is needed to verify 
Iraq's compliance. On March 17th George W. Bush articulated a 48-hour 
ultimatum towards Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq. The consequence 
of the refusal was about to be a military operation. Later that day the 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated that Iraq has failed to comply 
according the UN Resolution 1441 and criticised states that ware of a 
different opinion. Following Straw’s statement the Leader of the House of 
Commons Robin Cook, the predecessor of Straw in the FCO, resigned 
from his position stating that the prepared operation is not backed by the 
international community, therefore it is wrong.105  
On March 18th Blair gave a speeches to the Labour Party members 
of Parliament and then to the entire House of Commons. He spoke in 
favour of executing a military action together with the US against Iraq. 
The voting at the end of Blair’s speech to the House of Commons 
resulted in supporting the Prime Minister. Although was the decision 
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hardly unanimous. The same day were all the UN personnel withdrawn 
from Iraq. On March 20th 2003 after the 48-hour ultimatum expired, 
President Bush declared that the military operation Iraqi Freedom is being 
executed. Tony Blair articulated the aims of the mission: 'To remove 
Saddam Hussein from power, and disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass 
destruction.'106 The Russian, French, Chinese and Syrian political leaders 
condemned the military action.107 
 The war went better than Blair could have expected, at least from a 
military viewpoint. British soldiers were given an important role. Although 
there were many casualties, the number was much less than anticipated. 
Within three weeks, Iraqis in Baghdad had torn down a huge statue of 
Saddam Hussein that stood in a city square. In another three weeks, 
President Bush proclaimed the end of major military actions.108 
The evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq did not 
appear. The threat of weapons of mass destruction was the main reason 
that Blair had used as a justification go to war against Iraq. Blair himself 
thought that regime change was enough reason, but he knew that his 
position wasn’t shared by most politicians and public in Britain. There 
were accusations that Blair deliberately exaggerated the threat to make 
people in Britain believe that the war was necessary.109 
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Tony Blair has left the office in June 2007 after the third successful 
General Elections. The controversy of joining the US in the war in Iraq led 
to establishment of the inquiry in June 2009. The task of the inquiry was 
to reveal the initiation of and conduct of the war in Iraq. All people from 
Blair’s closest circle and even Blair himself were asked to testify at the 
hearings. The final report of the inquiry is due to be issued in Summer 
2012.110 
The decision to enter war in Iraq alongside the US showed to be 
unfortunate. The justification of what was in fact a war for regime change 
as a war to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction emerged as 
dishonest to the international community. One of Blair’s missteps was that 
he leaned on the security services. Tony Blair and George W. Bush were 
fighting a war for two different reasons. For President Bush Iraq was a 
demonstration of raw power to achieve a national purpose. For Blair it 
was about justice and the international community. But the failure of the 
aftermath of the Iraqi Freedom operation cannot be laid on Blair alone. 
Britain's contribution to the calamity is far smaller than of the US. But 
morally, even if not numerically, Blair did as many missteps as George W. 
Bush. 
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Conclusion 
Concerning the electoral matter, Tony Blair was the most 
successful leader of the Labour Party in its history. His vision for Britain 
managed to attract wide variety of voters in all three General Elections he 
lead the Labour Party into. His premiership was full of paradoxes. In the 
domestic policy he managed to make the concept of the Third Way work. 
With his renewed Labour Party, known as New Labour, he continued with 
the Thatcherite legacy, especially with the economic measures his 
government took.  
On the international stage he was an anticipated fresh change 
compared to his predecessor John Major. The first encounters with 
foreign policy were unsure for Blair. Thus it is no wonder that the first 
official statement on foreign policy of the UK was given by the Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook, not by the Prime Minister Blair. As the time went 
by, Blair’s confidence as the Prime Minister has grown immensely. He 
started as a personal friend of the US President Bill Clinton and has 
turned into one of the key world leaders. 
The first military operation he went into was by the side of the US. It 
can be argued that the dispute in Iraq in 1998 would not even have to 
happen if the allied forces had restrained Saddam Hussein in the first 
place. This operation clearly showed Blair’s desire for the 'Special 
Relationship' to evolve even in an extended matter. The US was the only 
world super power in the 1990s. But with our current world order, even a 
super power needs allies to help it, for example on the floor of the UN 
Security Council or in NATO. And Britain under Blair’s premiership was 
eager to take that place. Blair himself defined it as being the bridge 
between Europe and the US.  
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After the basic formation of Blair’s vision for Britain as being the 
bridge and a proactive country on the international stage, Blair formulated 
his personal values he wanted to pursue in the foreign policy. This 
transformation started with the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. With his 
'doctrine of international community' and the concept of 'humanitarian 
interventions' his journey as an international crusader for democracy and 
justice began. This practically meant that the external sovereignty of a 
state can be violated for sake of human rights. 
This concept was verified as a right solution to pursue in Sierra 
Leone. With the mandate from the international community Britain did the 
right thing that needed to be done. One thing about this operation is yet 
different. There was no US ally by British side. Britain was in the lead 
now. It can be argued that this has even strengthened Blair’s vision of 
himself as of the true world leader. The Prime Minister stood by the idea 
that what was in the global interest, was at Britain’s interest. 
The shocking moment came on September 11th 2001 with the 
terrorist attack on the US. All the clues led to al-Qaeda, a terrorist group 
operating from Afghanistan. In less than a month Tony Blair and the US 
President George W. Bush were able to gather a coalition supporting 
military strikes in the name of defence. Tony Blair showed as a skilful 
negotiator within those days. He very much contributed to the 
international community’s decision to approve the military strikes. For 
Blair personally, the events of September 11th 2001 were a turning point. 
He started to put more stress on justice, rather than on the ethical 
dimension. His personal involvement in the events also grew. His star as 
the key world player was at the top by that time and Blair was aware of 
that. He was not afraid to put his name behind as many actions as 
necessary. Although it was clear that he was a bit enchanted by his 
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position, it is without doubts that his intentions were really concerned with 
the justice. 
For many commentators, voters and even members of the Labour 
Party Iraq has been a disaster and blighted Blair’s premiership. Saddam 
Hussein had been in Blair’s sights for a long time. Until the invasion in 
March 2003, he had worked at justifying such action towards Hussein’s 
regime. He certainly welcomed the participation of the US, but was calling 
for action long before the election of George W. Bush. The decision to go 
to war met a significant opposition from the public and Labour MPs, but 
was backed by the Cabinet – except for Robin Cook – and the 
Parliament. Despite this fact, it was very much Blair’s personal decision 
and he has never apologised for it. He believed that at the time it was the 
right thing to do. It was justice. 
There was an undoubted moral dimension to Blair’s analyses of 
world events. It was probably a consequence of his determination to push 
certain views and actions in international affairs. In his closeness to the 
US, Blair damaged Britain’s relations with Germany and France and 
ruined his hopes of acting as a bridge between the EU and the US. In the 
future, British public, Parliament and Cabinet are more likely to be 
sceptical about the evidence a Prime Minister presents when dragging 
the UK into any kind of military action. 
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Resumé 
Diese Abschlussarbeit beschäftigt sich mit Tony Blair, als er zehn 
Jahre lang als der Ministerpräsident des Vereinigten Königsreichs diente, 
und sie analysiert seine Außenpolitik. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob 
seines Programm, seine Hauptreden und Leitbilder den realen 
Handlungen zustimmen. Man analysiert, ob die festgesetzten Ziele dieser 
Handlungen erreicht wurden. 
Der Erste Teil dieser Arbeit beschreibt, wie Tony Blair der Chef der 
britischen  Labour-Partei geworden ist und in welcher Form er zu der 
Gründung der New Labour beigetragen hat. Der Schwerpunkt liegt darin, 
die Folgen zu analysieren, die zu der Schaffung eines Rahmens der 
britischen Außenpolitik beigetragen haben. Der erste Abschnitt 
konfrontiert die vorher gemachten Erklärungen mit den realen 
Handlungen.  
 Der zweite Teil beschreibt fünf militärische Auseinandersetzungen, 
für die Tony Blair als Ministerpräsident ständig war. Es umfasst die 
Konflikte in Irak, Kosovo, Sierra Leone und Afghanistan. Diese Konflikte 
werden chronologisch geordnet. Alle fünf Teile umfassen die Hintergrund 
einzelnen Auseinandersetzungen, die Beteiligung des Vereinigten 
Königsreichs und die Einstellung der internationalen Gemeinschaft gegen 
den entsprechenden Konflikt. Folglich hat man darüber nachgedenkt, von 
welchen inneren Bewegungen Tony Blair beeinflusst wurde und ob diese 
Bewegungen seinen gemachten Erklärungen entsprochen haben.  
 
 
